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 ABSTRACT 
 
This paper* has two principal aims: first, to examine the achievements under the current Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (together 
referred to as ‘the Treaties’) towards the establishment of a European Social Union (ESU) and, 
second, to consider the possibilities for further steps towards that aim within the current Treaties. 
The paper addresses the need for an ESU mainly as regards the employment law dimension, the most 
well established area of EU social activity, and explains that in order to achieve the aim of having an 
ESU, the EU must have competence. The paper therefore explores the competences currently enjoyed 
by the EU in the social field – and outlines what the EU has done so far that is relevant for an ESU – 
but also emphasises the significant limits on those competences as well as suggesting that the old 
‘Community method’ or ‘ordinary Union method’ is running into difficulties in that regard. The paper 
then suggests some ideas going forward, before proposing possible ways of delivering them. In 
particular, we focus on what can be achieved through the so-far underutilised instrument of 
enhanced cooperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Many thanks to Sjoerd Feenstra and the other participants of the 23 May 2014 Leuven Euroforum 
Workshop for the helpful comments and questions, and to Frank Vandenbroucke for his insightful remarks 
on a draft of this paper.  
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A. INTRODUCTION 
This paper starts from the premise that, both as a matter of pragmatism and as a matter of 
principle,1 the Union has no choice but to address the social issues facing its citizens: 2 
 The functional requirements for a sustainable monetary union and the principled assertion 
that, at its core, the European project is a social model point in the same direction: the 
search for a strong consensus on the content of the European social model is no longer a 
superfluous luxury, but a necessity. 
In other words, the European social model is an integral part of the European Union project. It is not 
just there to legitimise what is being done in the economic domain but it is a value in its own right. 
What is the EU about other than, ultimately, improving the position of its people? 3 
While the substantive case for a European Social Union (ESU) is developed further in other KU 
Leuven Euroforum contributions, 4 our paper has two principal aims: first, to examine the 
achievements under the current Treaties towards the establishment of an ESU and, second, to 
consider the possibilities for further steps towards that aim within the current Treaties. The paper 
addresses the need for an ESU mainly as regards the employment law dimension, the most well 
established area of EU social activity, and explains that in order to achieve the aim of having an ESU, 
the EU must have competence (section B). This is an important limitation on the EU’s ability to act 
and one that is sometimes underestimated by those calling for a full ESU. The paper therefore 
explores the competences currently enjoyed by the EU in the social field – and outlines what the EU 
has done so far that is relevant for an ESU – but also emphasises the significant limits on those 
competences as well as suggesting that the old ‘Community method’ or ‘ordinary Union method’ is 
running into difficulties in that regard (section B). The paper then suggests some ideas going 
forward, before proposing possible ways of delivering them. In particular, we focus on what can be 
achieved through the so-far underutilised instrument of enhanced cooperation. As Karl Lamers and 
Wolfgang Schäuble wrote in the Financial Times,5  
We must continue to advance the European project using the imperfect and incomplete 
instruments and institutions that we have today. To this end, our efforts in the coming years 
must focus on policy areas that are decisive for boosting growth and employment.  
                                                                
 
1 See C Barnard, ‘EU employment law and the European Social Model: the past, the present and the future’ 
(2014) 67 Current Legal Problems (forthcoming). 
2 F Vandenbroucke, Europe: The Social Challenge. Defining the Union’s social objective is a necessity rather 
than a luxury (Brussels: Observatoire social européen, Opinion Paper No 11, July 2012) 24. 
3 eg art 3(1)-(3) TEU. 
4 See F Vandenbroucke, The Case for a European Social Union (Leuven: KU Leuven Euroforum, 2014); and T 
Vandevelde, Ethical Justifications of Social Europe (Leuven: KU Leuven Euroforum, 2014). 
5 K Lamers and W Schäuble, ‘More integration is still the right goal for Europe’, The Financial Times 31 August 
2014. 
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We very much agree with this statement. Section C thus focuses on what (realistically) can be done 
and how. Section D concludes. 
B. THE NEED FOR COMPETENCE 
 INTRODUCTION 1.
Under the principle of conferral, the Union is to act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States. 6 Before 
contemplating any action, towards an ESU or otherwise, the Union must therefore first determine 
whether it actually has competence to do so. This has two implications:  
a) the EU is incapable of extending its own competences, and  
b) it does not have general law-making capacity.  
Put differently, every single EU action requires one or more legal bases in the Treaties, which must 
be based on objective factors (including the aim and content of the measure) that are amenable to 
judicial review,7 and which determine both the vertical and horizontal division of competences.8 In 
other words, the principle of conferral determines whether the Union has competence to act 
(vertical) and, if so, which institution can act in accordance with which procedure (horizontal). The 
institutional aspect of the principle of conferral is explicitly confirmed in Article 13(2) TEU, according 
to which each institution is to ‘act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and 
in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them.’ 9 
The steps the EU can currently take towards an ESU are therefore determined and limited by the 
Treaties. The next sections outline the precise areas over which the EU has competence and how 
that competence has been used. 
  
                                                                
 
6 Arts 4(1) and 5(2) TEU. 
7 Case C-658/11 Parliament v Council EU:C:2014:2025, para 43 and the case-law cited there.  
8 See Case C-301/06 Ireland v Parliament and Council EU:C:2009:68, para 56.  
9 This is followed by a stipulation that the institutions are to ‘practice mutual sincere cooperation’. 
Page 7 of 45 
 
 
   
 SPECIFIC AND GENERAL LEGAL BASES 2.
2.1 SPECIFIC LEGAL BASES 
A) ARTICLE 118A EEC AND ARTICLE 153 TFEU 
THE EVOLUTION OF EU COMPETENCE 
The Union acts ordinarily on the basis of ‘specific powers’, which are not necessarily the express 
consequence of specific provisions of the Treaties but may also be implied from them.10 The original 
Treaty of Rome contained no specific legal basis for ‘social’ matters. Its limited Title on social policy 
only contained provisions relating to equal pay 11 and paid holiday schemes 12 and even these 
provisions contained no express powers for the EU to act in these fields. The main substantive 
provision relating to workers was not found in the social Title at all but in the Title on free 
movement: Article 45 TFEU allows workers to move to another Member State to take up 
employment there. Article 46 TFEU gave the EU the power to ‘issue directives or make regulations 
setting out the measures required to bring about freedom of movement for workers, as defined in 
Article 45’. There are equivalent enabling provisions for freedom of establishment and free 
movement of services (Articles 53(1) and 62 TFEU). 
The key to understanding the Treaty drafters’ limited ambitions in the social field lay in Article 117 
EEC.13 The provision said that the Member States agreed upon the need to promote improved 
working conditions and an improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible their 
harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained. The Member States then affirmed their 
belief that such a development would ensue not only from the functioning of the common market, 
which would favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also from the procedures provided for 
in the EEC Treaty and from the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action. 14 Article 117 therefore encapsulated two ideas. First, harmonisation in social 
matters would follow spontaneously from economic integration. Second, only economic 
organization ought to be pursued at the level of the (then) Community. The Member States would 
be in charge of any social policies they thought would need to be adopted. 15 The EU was therefore 
never initially conceived as a social union; social policy was primarily the responsibility of the 
Member States at national level. 
                                                                
 
10 Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms EU:C:1996:140, para 25. 
11 Art 119 EEC (now art 157 TFEU). 
12 Art 120 EEC (now art 158 TFEU). 
13 Now amended art 151 TFEU. 
14 See further F Vandenbroucke and B Vanhercke, A European Social Union: 10 tough nuts to crack (Brussels: 
Friends of Europe, 2014) 24.  
15 ibid, 64.  
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That view began to change in the 1970s, in part for economic reasons: countries with higher social 
standards feared that they were at a competitive disadvantage. Eventually this led to the 
introduction of a specific legal basis for social policy matters by the Single European Act 1986 (SEA), 
namely Article 118a EEC, now Article 153 TFEU in the field of health and safety which allowed for 
qualified majority voting in the Council. Article 118a EEC provided: 
1. Member States shall pay particular attention to encouraging improvements, especially in the 
working environment, as regards the health and safety of workers 
2. In order to help achieve the objective laid down in the first paragraph, the Council, acting by 
qualified majority voting … shall adopt by means of directives, minimum requirements for 
gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in 
each Member State. 
While a step forward, many on the left were disappointed by the lack of ambition of the SEA. 
However, the (then) Commission President was instrumental in securing the adoption of the (non-
legally binding) Community Social Charter 1989 whose accompanying Action Programme led to the 
adoption of important directives which made full use of the new powers introduces by the SEA. These 
included: 
• The Framework Directive 89/391 on health and safety16  
• The Pregnant workers Directive 92/85/EEC17  
• Directive 91/383 on health and safety of atypical workers18 
• The Young workers Directive 94/33/EEC19  
• The Working Time Directive 93/104/EEC20 (repealed and replaced by Directive 2003/88)21  
Two other important measures, also adopted in this period, used the general legal basis (Article 100 
EEC (Article 115 TFEU)) or the single market legal basis (Articles 57(2) and 66 EEC (Articles 53(1) and 
62 TFEU)), discussed in the next section: 
• Proof of Contract of Employment Directive 91/533/EEC,22 adopted under Article 100 EEC 
(Article 115 TFEU); 
• Posted workers Directive 96/71/EEC,23 adopted under Articles 57(2) and 66 EEC (Articles 
53(1) and 62 TFEU). 
                                                                
 
16 OJ 1989 L183/1. 
17 OJ 1992 L348/1. 
18 OJ 1991 L206/19 
19 OJ 1994 L216/12. 
20 OJ 1993 L307/18. 
21 OJ 2000 L195/41. 
22 OJ 1991 L288/32. 
23 OJ 1997 L18/6. 
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The content of Article 118A EEC has now been wrapped up into Article 153 TFEU which envisages, 
following the Maastricht Treaty, a significantly increased range of competence for the EU in the 
social field. Article 153 provides: 
1. With a view to achieving the objectives of Article 151, the Union shall support and 
complement the activities of the Member States in the following fields:  
(a) improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers’ health and 
safety;  
(b) working conditions;  
(c) social security and social protection of workers;  
(d) protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated;  
(e) the information and consultation of workers; 
(f) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, 
including co-determination, subject to paragraph 5;  
(g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory;  
(h) the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, without prejudice to Article 
166;  
(i) equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and 
treatment at work;  
(j) the combating of social exclusion;  
(k) the modernisation of social protection systems without prejudice to point (c). 
The Article continues that ‘To this end, the European Parliament and the Council ... (b) may adopt, in 
the fields referred to in paragraph 1(a) to (i), by means of directives, minimum requirements for 
gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of the 
Member States. Such directives shall avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints in 
a way which would hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized 
undertakings.’ The general rule is the ordinary legislative procedure. However, in the fields referred 
to in paragraph 1(c), (d), (f) and (g), the Council must act unanimously, in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, after consulting the European Parliament and the relevant Committees.  
Five points should be noted about Article 153 TFEU. First, the directives are intended to lay down 
minimum (but not necessarily minimal) standards. Article 153(4) TFEU reiterates the point: The 
provisions adopted pursuant to this Article ‘shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or 
introducing more stringent protective measures compatible with the Treaties’. As the CJEU held in 
the Working Time Directive case, that provision  
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does not limit [Union] action to the lowest common denominator, or even to the lowest 
level of protection established by the various Member States, but means that Member 
States are free to provide a level of protection more stringent than that resulting from 
[Union] law, high as it may be. 24 
Second, EU action in social policy areas on the basis of Article 153 TFEU must not ‘affect the right of 
Member States to define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and must not 
significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof’. 25  
Third, at Nice it was agreed that the European Parliament and Council may ‘adopt measures 
designed to encourage cooperation between Member States through initiatives aimed at improving 
knowledge, developing exchanges of information and best practices, promoting innovative 
approaches and evaluating experiences, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of 
the Member States’. This reflects the increasing use of the OMC (open method of coordination) 
which is considered below. 
Fourth, three areas of high sensitivity (pay, strikes and lock-outs) are expressly excluded (under 
Article 153(5) TFEU) from EU competence altogether, at least under Article 153. However, Article 
153(5) TFEU has not precluded the EU legislating in respect of, for example, pay-related issues, such 
as equal pay (see eg Directive 2006/54), provided the issue does not concern the constituent parts of 
pay, the level of pay or the setting of a minimum or guaranteed wage. 26 As the Court said in Bruno & 
Pettini, Article 153(5) TFEU has to be narrowly construed because it is a derogation from Articles 
153(1)-(4) TFEU. 27  
Fifth, even in those areas excluded from EU competence, the Court of Justice has made clear that 
the Member States and social partners still had to exercise their competence consistently with EU 
law, including the principle of non-discrimination 28 and the four freedoms. This can be seen in the 
controversial but highly significant decisions of Viking and Laval.29  
VIKING AND LAVAL 
Viking concerned a Finnish company wanting to reflag its vessel, the Rosella, under the Estonian flag 
so that it could staff the ship with an Estonian crew to be paid considerably less than the existing 
Finnish crew. The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) told its affiliates to boycott the 
Rosella and to take other solidarity industrial action. Viking sought an injunction in the English High 
Court, restraining the ITF and the Finnish Seaman’s Union (FSU), now threatening strike action, from 
breaching Article 49 TFEU on freedom of establishment.  
                                                                
 
24 Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council (‘Working Time Directive’) EU:C:1996:431, para 56. 
25 Art 153(4) TFEU. 
26 Joined Cases C-395/08 and C-396/08 Bruno and Others EU:C:2010:329, para 37. 
27 ibid, para 36. 
28 ibid, para 39. 
29 Case C-438/05 Viking EU:C:2007:772 and Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri EU:C:2007:809. 
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In Laval, a Latvian company won a contract to refurbish a school in Sweden using its own, Latvian, 
workers who earned about 40% less than comparable Swedish workers. The Swedish construction 
union wanted Laval to apply the Swedish collective agreement but Laval refused, in part because the 
collective agreement was unclear as to how much Laval would have to pay its workers. There 
followed a union picket at the school site, a blockade by construction workers, and sympathy 
industrial action by the electricians’ unions. Although this industrial action was lawful under Swedish 
law, Laval brought proceedings in the Swedish labour court, claiming that this action was contrary to 
EU law, namely Article 56 TFEU on the free movement of services and the Posted Workers’ Directive.  
The Court said that EU law did apply to national labour law on strike action 30 but acknowledged for 
the first time that the right to take collective action, including the right to strike, was a fundamental 
right, referring to Article 28 of the Charter. However, the Court did say that the right to strike was 
subject to limits laid down by both national law and practices (eg notice and balloting rules) and EU 
law (ie the rules had to be justified and proportionate, as considered below). The Court also 
confirmed that Articles 49 and 56 TFEU applied to trade unions. 
The Court then found that the collective action constituted a restriction on free movement and so 
breached Articles 49 and 56 TFEU. On justification, the Court noted in Viking that the right to take 
collective action for the protection of workers was an overriding reason of public interest provided 
that jobs or conditions of employment were jeopardised or under serious threat. On the facts, the 
Court suggested this was unlikely because Viking had given an undertaking that no Finnish workers 
would be made redundant.  
If, however, the trade unions could justify the collective action, the national court would have to 
apply the proportionality test. The Court then applied a strict form of the proportionality test, 
unmitigated by any references to ‘margin of appreciation’. On the question of suitability, the Court 
said that collective action might be one of the main ways in which trade unions protected the 
interests of their members. However, on the question of necessity, the Court said it was for the 
national court to examine whether FSU had other means less restrictive of freedom of establishment 
to bring the collective negotiations with Viking to a successful conclusion, and whether FSU had 
exhausted those means before starting the collective action. In other words, industrial action should 
be the last resort.  
Turning to Laval, the CJEU recognised that the right to take collective action for the protection of 
Swedish workers ‘against possible social dumping’ was a justification but found on the facts that 
using collective action to force Laval to sign a collective agreement whose content on central 
matters such as pay was unclear could not be justified. Laval also considered the effects of the 
Posted Workers Directive 96/71. It found that because Sweden had not complied to the letter with 
the terms laid down by the Directive, it could not invoke the Directive to require the Latvian workers 
to enjoy the terms and conditions of employment enjoyed by Swedish workers. Furthermore, 
                                                                
 
30 Despite art 153(5) TFEU, which provides that the EU has no competence to legislate on the right to strike. 
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because the Swedish terms and conditions breached the Directive, strike action to enforce those 
terms and conditions was also unlawful. 
Much has been written about these controversial cases but for the purposes of this paper two points 
are particularly relevant. First, prior to these decisions, the Court had attempted to respect the 
original settlement contained in the Treaty of Rome that social policy was largely a matter for 
domestic law. It had deployed a number of techniques to protect (national) social policy from the 
application of the (hierarchically superior) economic provisions on the internal market. These 
included ring-fencing national measures intended to improve working conditions from the scope of 
the competition provisions31 or finding the effect of the national social rule on free movement too 
remote. 32  
However, in Viking and Laval the Court eschewed both approaches and applied its internal market 
case law with full vigour. The moment collective action was found to be a ‘restriction’ and thus in 
breach of EU law, the ‘social’ interests were on the back-foot, having to defend themselves from the 
economic rights of free movement. And the Court has made it difficult to defend the social interests 
due to its strict approach to justification and proportionality. So, despite recognition of the right to 
strike for the first time in these cases, the limitations on the exercise of that right laid down by EU 
law subsume much of the right. 
The second point concerns the EU’s response to the judgments. Because the Court applied the four 
freedoms to an area expressly excluded from EU competence (strikes) it created a legislative 
vacuum. It potentially struck down the national rules but the EU could not deal with the problem 
given the absence of express competence to act. This is one aspect of the so-called social deficit in 
the EU. In fact, an attempt was made, in the Monti II proposal, to address the problem. This proposal 
was introduced using one of the general legal bases, Article 352 TFEU (see below), but the proposal 
prompted such fierce criticism from all sides, including the trade unions, that it was rapidly 
withdrawn.  
B) ARTICLES 157 AND 19 TFEU 
So far we have focused on the main legal basis in the social field, Article 153 TFEU. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam expanded EU competence in the social field still further. It strengthened the provisions 
on equal pay to include a new legal basis. Article 157(3) TFEU provides: 
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt measures 
to ensure the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men 
and women in matters of employment and occupation, including the principle of equal pay 
for equal work or work of equal value.  
                                                                
 
31 Case C-67/96 Albany EU:C:1999:430. This technique has also been used by the legislature: see eg arts 1(6) 
and (7) of the Services Directive 2006/123. 
32 Case C–190/98 Graf v Filzmozer Maschinenbau GmbH EU:C:2000:49. 
Page 13 of 45 
 
 
   
The recast Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54 (considered below) was adopted under this basis. 
Article 157(4) TFEU continued that the principle of equal treatment would not ‘prevent any Member 
State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it 
easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for 
disadvantages in professional careers.’ In other words, Member States were allowed to adopt 
measures which are positively discriminatory, if they so choose. 
The Amsterdam Treaty introduced a further legal basis, Article 19 TFEU, into the Treaty (but not into 
the Title on Social Policy). This provides: ‘Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and 
within the limits of the powers conferred by it on the Community, the Council, acting unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take 
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation.’ This led to the enactment of two important Directives:  
• Directive 2000/43 on equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial origin,33 
and  
• Directive 2000/78 the general framework Directive for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation.34 
C) THE EMPLOYMENT TITLE 
So far we have focused on the creation of legal bases that empower the EU to legislate, usually to 
adopt Directives. The adoption of a new Title on Employment constituted a significant departure 
from the norm. This Title envisaged a new approach, referred to in the jargon as OMC, based on 
target setting, peer review, and guidelines. This change of approach was signalled in Article 145 
TFEU: Member States and the Union are to ‘work towards developing a co-ordinated strategy for 
employment and particularly for promoting a skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labour 
markets responsive to economic change’. The Union is to support and, if necessary, complement 
Member States’ action. 35 Article 148 TFEU provides that the Council is to adopt certain labour 
market policies, albeit in the form of soft law, drawing up guidelines on employment.  
These guidelines have been revised a number of times but they generally contain a mix of active 
labour market policy (education, training) with exhortations to states to deregulate to make the 
labour market more flexible. These guidelines and the general OMC approach fed into the Lisbon 
Strategy 2000 which was intended to make the EU ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge 
based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion’ by 2010. Despite the chronic failure of the strategy – caused largely by the 
worst financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression - the legacy of the Lisbon strategy can 
still be felt in the ‘EU2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’. As with the Lisbon 
Strategy, the European Council agrees on headline targets, ‘which constitute shared objectives 
                                                                
 
33 OJ 2000 L180/22. 
34 OJ 2000 L303/16. 
35 Art 147 TFEU. 
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guiding the action of the Member States and of the Union’. In the light of the headline targets, 
‘Member States will set their national targets, taking account of their relative starting positions and 
national circumstances. They will do so according to their national decision-making procedures, in a 
dialogue with the Commission in order to check consistency with the EU headline targets.’ 
The change of approach signalled by the Employment Title suggested that the old ‘Community 
method or ‘ordinary Union method’ was running out of road. The terms ‘Community’ or ‘ordinary 
Union’ method denote the traditional form of integration based on market integration. As a method 
of institutional decision-making, it is characterized by (i) the central role of the Commission in 
formulating proposals; 36 (ii) qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council; 37 (iii) involvement of the 
European Parliament with varying intensity depending on the decision-making procedure, but since 
Lisbon as a rule through the ordinary legislative procedure; 38 and (iv) the role of the CJEU in 
ensuring that ‘in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed’. 39 The 
ordinary Union method and the areas of policy in which it applies are often seen as the cornerstone 
of European integration. 40 However, such an approach is difficult to duplicate for issues such as 
public budgets, wages, and labour markets, 41 which are not susceptible to edicts in traditional 
legislative form. 
2.2 GENERAL LEGAL BASES 
A) ARTICLES 114 AND 115 TFEU 
So far we have focused on the specific legal bases. The Treaties also contain more general legal 
bases, such as Articles 114 and 115 TFEU, and the so-called ‘flexibility clause’ in Article 352 TFEU. 
These general legal bases are intended to serve a residual function, applying only in the absence of a 
specific basis. They may not be used as a legal basis in order to circumvent an express exclusion of 
harmonisation laid down in specific articles of the Treaties.42 
Articles 114 and 115 TFEU empower the Union to adopt the ‘measures for the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as 
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market’ (Article 114(1) TFEU) or to 
issue, in any field, ‘directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal 
market’ (Article 115 TFEU).  
                                                                
 
36 Art 17(2) TEU. 
37 Art 16(3) TEU. 
38 Arts 289 and 294 TFEU.  
39 Art 19(1) TEU. 
40 See eg the Opinion of Mazák AG in Case C-440/05 Commission v Council EU:C:2007:393, point 46. 
41 R Thillaye, L Kouba, A Sachs, Reforming EU economic governance: is ‘more’ any better? (Progressive 
Economy call for papers, February 2014, on file with the authors) 3. 
42 Case C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council (‘Tobacco Advertising I’) EU:C:2000:544, para 
79. 
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To justify recourse to Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis what matters is that the measure adopted 
on that basis must actually be intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. 43 While a reasonably broad scope of measures could be pursued 
on that basis, it appears safe to assume that measures in the broader realm of social policy 
regarding, for example, the fundamentals of pensions, the redistribution of wealth through a reform 
of the tax system or the size of the expenditure on health are beyond the limits of that 
competence. 44 The usefulness of Article 114 TFEU as a legal basis for social policy measures is also 
severely limited by the fact that it cannot apply to ‘fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free 
movement of persons nor to those relating to the rights and interests of employed persons’. 45 
Article 115 TFEU contains no such exclusion, but measures on that legal basis are adopted in 
accordance with a stricter decision-making procedure, requiring unanimity in the Council.  
B) ARTICLE 352 TFEU 
In the absence of a specific legal basis for Union action in the Treaties, recourse may be had to 
Article 352 TFEU. That provision enables the Union to adopt the appropriate measures if action by 
the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to 
attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary 
powers.46  
However, this competence under Article 352 TFEU ‘does not create an obligation, but confers on the 
Council an option, failure to exercise which cannot affect the validity of proceedings’. 47 Put 
differently, it is not true that if something can be done under Article 352 TFEU, it has to be done so 
instead under Member State competences. The Council has a large discretion to determine whether 
action is necessary. 48 Nevertheless, this discretion is limited. First, recourse to Article 352 TFEU is 
justified only where no other provision of the Treaties either expressly or impliedly gives the Union 
institutions the necessary power to adopt the measure in question.49 Secondly, any recourse to 
Article 352 TFEU should, in accordance with the principle of conferral, stay well within the scope of 
the Treaties. This was borne out by the Court’s reasoning on Article 352 TFEU as a possible legal 
                                                                
 
43 Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council (‘Tobacco Advertising II’) EU:C:2006:772, para 80. 
44 A Hinarejos, ‘The Euro Area Crisis and Constitutional Limits to Fiscal Integration’ (2011-2012) 14 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 261. 
45 Art 114(2) TFEU. 
46 Art 352(1) TFEU. 
47 Case 22/70 Commission v Council (‘ERTA’) EU:C:1971:32, para 95. 
48 See eg Case 8/73 Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v Massey Ferguson EU:C:1973:90, paras 3-6. 
49 Joined Cases C-51/89, C-90/89, and C-94/89 United Kingdom, France and Germany v Council EU:C:1991:241, 
para 6; Opinion 2/92 Competence of the Community or one of its institutions to participate in the Third 
Revised Decision of the OECD on national treatment EU:C:1995:83, para 36. 
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basis for accession of the then Community to the European Convention on Human Rights50 in 
Opinion 2/94.51  
Should the Union wish to act on the basis of Article 352 TFEU, the Council must act unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 52 If 
necessary, the Union can combine Article 352 TFEU with other provisions of the Treaty if they in 
themselves do not constitute a sufficient legal basis. 53 However, Article 352 TFEU may not be used 
to supplement a specific Treaty provision that limits Union competence by excluding coverage of 
certain policy areas or the use of certain instruments. Accordingly, measures based on Article 352 
TFEU may not entail harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations in cases where the 
Treaties exclude such harmonisation. 54 Where recourse is made to Article 352 TFEU in combination 
with other legal basis in the Treaty, the relevant procedural requirements are to be combined. The 
Court thus allows for the unanimity requirement of Article 352 TFEU to be combined with other 
procedures, such as, notably, the ordinary legislative procedure, which would otherwise provide for 
qualified majority voting.55 Since Lisbon, the Commission also has the obligation to draw national 
parliaments’ attention to proposals based on Article 352.56 
Article 352(1) TFEU stipulates that action on that legal basis must be ‘necessary to attain one of the 
objectives set out in the Treaties’. These objectives notably include the establishment of an internal 
market and in that connection (since Lisbon) working ‘for the sustainable development of Europe 
based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, 
aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of 
the quality of the environment’. 57 Nevertheless, the fact that the Union is to pursue its objectives by 
appropriate means commensurate with the competences conferred upon it in the Treaties, 
combined with the impossibility since Lisbon of using Article 352 TFEU to circumvent the lack of a 
harmonization competence 58 together imply that the usefulness of that provision directly to pursue 
                                                                
 
50 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 
221. 
51 Opinion 2/94 (n 10). 
52 Art 352(1) TFEU. 
53 See eg Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
EU:C:2008:461, paras 211-214. 
54 Art 352(3) TFEU. 
55 Case C-166/07 Parliament v Council EU:C:2009:499, para 69. This should be contrasted with the Court’s 
approach in Case C-300/89 Commission v Council (‘Titanium Dioxide’) EU:C:1991:244, on which see further 
below. For a commentary on the CJEU’s case law, see G De Baere, ‘From “Don’t Mention the Titanium 
Dioxide Judgment” to “I Mentioned it Once, But I Think I Got Away with it All Right”: Reflections on the 
Choice of Legal Basis in EU External Relations after the Legal Basis for Restrictive Measures Judgment’ (2012-
2013) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 540-544. 
56 Art 352(2) TFEU. 
57 Art 3(3) TEU. 
58 Art 352(3) TFEU. 
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the social objectives in the Treaty is limited. 59 This was more than amply demonstrated by the 
Monti II saga, which is considered below. 
Any assessment of the potential use of Article 352 TFEU must also take into account the national 
constitutional orders of Member States, both through national mechanisms designed to enhance 
parliamentary oversight of the use of Article 352 TFEU, such as Section 8 of the UK European Union 
Act 2011, and through what constitutional courts have had to say on the matter. The former 
requires that a UK minister does not vote in favour or support a proposal based on Article 352 TFEU 
unless one of the mechanisms for involvement of the Houses of Parliament provided there is 
complied with. An example of the latter is the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s view in its Lissabon Urteil 
that Article 352 TFEU can be construed in such a way that the integration programme envisaged 
there can still be predicted and determined by the German legislative bodies. 60 However, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht warned that the provision meets with constitutional objections  
 with regard to the ban on transferring blanket empowerments or on transferring 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, because the newly worded provision makes it possible substantially 
to amend treaty foundations of the European Union without the constitutive participation of 
legislative bodies in addition to the Member States’ executive powers. 61 
The duty to inform national parliaments pursuant to Article 352(2) TFEU does not alter that 
assessment, because the Commission is only required to draw the national parliaments’ attention to 
the relevant proposal. The Bundesverfassungsgericht therefore imposes an important procedural 
limit on the use of Article 352 TFEU: 62 
 Because of the indefinite nature of future application of the flexibility clause, its use 
constitutionally requires ratification by the German Bundestag and the Bundesrat on the 
basis of Article 23.1 second and third sentence of the Basic Law. The German representative 
in the Council may not express formal approval on behalf of the Federal Republic of 
Germany of a corresponding lawmaking proposal of the Commission as long as these 
constitutionally required preconditions are not met. 
Such requirements pose a clear limitation on the potential for the use of the flexibility clause. 
As we have seen, Article 352 was controversially used as the legal basis for the proposal for the 
adoption of the so-called Monti II Regulation 63 intended to address the problems arising from the 
Court’s judgments in Viking and Laval .64 A number of Member States argued that the Commission 
                                                                
 
59 K Armstrong, Governing Social Inclusion: Europeanization through Policy Coordination (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 244-245. 
60 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009, para 322. 
61 ibid, para 328. 
62 ibid, paras 328 and 417. 
63 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of 
the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services COM(2012) 130. 
64 n 29. 
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was deliberately using Article 352 TFEU to circumvent the limits in Article 153(5) TFEU (which, as we 
saw above, excludes the application of Article 153 as a vehicle to legislate in the field, inter alia, of 
strike law). 65 The Yellow card procedure under the Subsidiarity Protocol was invoked and the 
Commission withdrew the proposal. 66 The fate of the Monti II proposal sent a clear signal that the 
prospects for adopting future social policy at least under Article 352 TFEU were all but dead. 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the problem could be overcome by implementing Article 
352 TFEU measures by means of an enhanced cooperation initiative. 67 The possibility to rely on 
enhanced cooperation will be further examined below. 
C) THE USE OF THE GENERAL LEGAL BASES IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL POLICY 
While Monti II has sent out a signal that it is going to be increasingly difficult to use the general legal 
bases to develop social policy measures in the future, this has not always been the case. As we have 
seen, the original Treaty of Rome contained no express competence for the EU to legislate in the field 
of social policy; social policy was seen as a matter for domestic law. However, the idea that economic 
policy should be designed at EU level while social policymaking remains in neatly separated national 
or regional arenas was, at best, naive. As the premise for EU social policy, it was a recipe for a 
dwindling capacity of the Member States to direct their own social policies (since they were ever 
increasingly constrained by their commitments at EU level which are considered in more detail 
below), without greater steering capacity on the part of the EU. 68 
This was recognised by the early 1970s when the Heads of State agreed that the attainment of a 
social dimension was, to them, as important, as economic union. This precipitated a flurry of 
legislative activity in three policy domains: gender equality, protection of employees on the 
restructuring of their business, and health and safety. In the absence of any specific legal bases, all of 
these measures were adopted under the general legal bases. So, in the field of gender equality, 
three directives were adopted: 
 
                                                                
 
65 eg UK House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, ‘Reasoned Opinion of the House of Commons 
concerning a Draft Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services’ (UKHC 2012-13). 
66 C Barnard, Competence Review: the internal market (HM Government Balance of Competence Review, 2014) 
31. For an overview and analysis of national parliaments’ reasoned opinions and their identification of 
subsidiarity issues or their failure to do so, see F Fabbrini en K Granat, ‘Yellow card, but no foul: The role of 
the national parliaments under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission proposal for an EU Regulation 
on the right to strike’ (2013) Common Market Law Review 135-139. 
67 GL Tosato, ‘New institutional solutions for multi-tier governance?’ in I Pernice, M Poiares Maduro, J-V Louis, 
JA Emmanouilidis, B de Witte, R Dehousse, W Wessels, JHH Weiler, M Kumm, A Manzella, GL Tosato, VA 
Schmidt, I Begg, Challenges of multi-tier governance in the European Union Effectiveness, efficiency and 
legitimacy, Compendium of Notes (European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy 
Department C: Citizens' Rights And Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Affairs, 2013) 158. 
68 Vandenbroucke (n 2) 24. 
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• Directive 75/117 on equal pay,69 adopted under Article 100 EEC (now Article 115 TFEU); 
• Directive 76/207 on equal treatment,70 adopted under Article 235 EEC (now Article 352 
TFEU);  
• Directive 79/7 on equal treatment in social security,71 adopted under Article 235 EEC (now 
Article 352 TFEU). 
These were followed up in the 1980s by: 
• Directive 86/378 on equal treatment in occupational social security,72 adopted under 
Articles 100 and 235 EEC (now Article 115 TFEU and 352 TFEU);  
• Directive 86/613 on the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in 
an activity in a self-employed capacity,73 adopted under Articles 100 and 235 EEC (now 
Articles 115 and 352 TFEU), repealed and replaced by Directive 2010/41,74 adopted under 
Article 157(3) TFEU) 
Directives 75/117, 76/207 and 86/378 have been consolidated into Directive 2006/54,75 adopted 
under Article 141(3) EC (now Article 157(3) TFEU). 
The 1970s also saw the adoption of Directives on the employment implications of business 
restructuring: 
• Directive 77/187 on transfers of undertakings,76 adopted under Article 100 EEC (now Article 
115 TFEU) now repealed and replaced by Directive 2001/23,77 adopted under Article 94 EC 
(now Article 115 TFEU)); 
• Directive 80/987 on insolvency,78 adopted under Article 100 EEC (now Article 115 TFEU), 
repealed and replaced by Directive 2008/94;79 
• Directive 75/129 on collective redundancies,80 adopted under Article 100 EEC (now Article 
115 TFEU), repealed and replaced by Directive 98/59,81 also adopted under Article 100 EEC. 
The adoption of such a number of social texts under the general legal bases is rather remarkable. 
Although the legislature adopted a fairly generous reading of the scope of the general legal bases, 
the requirement of unanimous voting in Council constrained too ambitious a reading of EU 
competence. However, as the EU’s competence in the social field has expanded, measures are 
increasingly adopted under specific legal bases, as the Recast Directive 2006/54 shows. 
                                                                
 
69 OJ 1975 L45/19. 
70 OJ 1976 L39/40, as amended by Directive 2002/73 (OJ 2002 L269/15). 
71 OJ 1979 L6/24 
72 OJ 1986 L225/40. 
73 OJ 1986 L359/56. 
74 OJ 2010 L180/1. 
75 OJ 2006 L204/23. 
76 OJ 1975 L48/29. 
77 OJ 2001 L82/16. 
78 OJ 1980 L283/23. 
79 OJ 2008 L283/36. 
80 OJ 1975 L48/29. 
81 OJ 1998 L225/16. 
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 THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL PARTNERS 3.
So far we have focused on the Treaty provisions giving the EU legislature the competence to act. The 
Maastricht Treaty introduced an important innovation into the constitutional development of EU 
social law: it gave to the social partners the power to adopt European-wide interprofessional or 
intersectoral collective agreements which can then be given erga omnes effect (ie general 
application) by a Council ‘decision’ (in practice a Directive). This means that the Council can 
effectively rubberstamp a collective agreement negotiated by the social partners and turn it into a 
piece of legislation that must be implemented by the Member States. Three main directives have 
been adopted via this route: 
• the Parental Leave Directive 96/34/EC82 (repealed and replaced by Directive 
2010/18/EU83); 
• the Part-time Workers Directive 97/81/EC;84  
• the Fixed-term work Directive 99/70/EC.85  
The social partners were unable to reach an agreement on agency work and eventually this was 
agreed via the usual legislative route: Directive 2008/104.86 
The striking feature of these directives is that they contained significant space for Member States 
and or the social partners, or for the states acting in conjunction with the social partners, to spell out 
the detail of the standards in the Directive (eg the length of certain rest breaks, the start of the leave 
year) or even to derogate from the social standards (see eg the so-called ‘Swedish derogation’ in the 
Agency Work Directive, which allows states not to apply the directive in respect of pay to temporary 
workers who have a permanent contract of employment with the agency and who continue to be 
paid between postings). This flexibility is an important means for the EU to accommodate EU level 
rights with diversity of industrial relations in the national systems. 
In addition to these intersectoral collective agreements, the sectoral social dialogue has produced 
more than 500 texts of varying legal status, ranging from joint opinions and responses to 
consultations to agreements that have been implemented as EU legislation. There are four 
European-wide agreements, plus one amendment, which have legislative force: 
• Working time of Seafarers Directive 99/63,87 as amended by Directive 2009/13/EC;88  
• Working time in Civil aviation 2000/79;89  
• Directive 2005/47 on certain aspects of the working conditions of mobile workers 
engaged in interoperable cross-border services in the railway sector;90  
                                                                
 
82 OJ 1996 L145/9. 
83 OJ 2010 L68/13. 
84 OJ 1998 L14/9. 
85 OJ 1999 L244/64. 
86 OJ 2008 L327/9. 
87 OJ 1999 L167/33. 
88 OJ 2009 L124/30. 
89 OJ 2000 L302/57. 
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• The Sharps Directive 2010/32.91 
Where the Council refuses to endorse a Commission proposal to give legal force to a collective 
agreement, as was the case with the Hairdressers Agreement, the social partners remain free, 
according to Article 155(2) TFEU, to implement an agreement ‘in accordance with the procedures 
and practices specific to management and labour and the Member States’—so-called autonomous 
agreements. 
This collective route to legislation, seen as a manifestation of subsidiarity and as key route to 
developing legislation in the social field has not in fact delivered on expectations. There are two 
main reasons for this. First, this method of legislating has been dogged by questions about the 
legitimacy of the social partners involved in the negotiating process.92 Second, particularly since the 
crisis, the trade union movement has been weakened. This, combined with the absence of a realistic 
prospect of the EU adopting legislation in the absence of a collective agreement, has meant that 
employers have had little incentive to negotiate and so have generally refused to play ball. 
 THE RATIONALE FOR EU LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION 4.
The story so far suggests a continuous broadening of the EU’s competence to legislate in the social 
field, albeit that this has not been matched by a vigorous use of that competence by the EU 
legislature. In fact, EU social legislation is piecemeal: it covers the requirement to consult over 
collective dismissals but no rules on the dismissal themselves. In fact measures in what is 
traditionally regarded as employment law in the Member States (dismissal law, rules on collective 
bargaining, freedom of association, and collective action) have not been adopted at EU level, in part 
due to the lack of competence (eg strikes, lock-outs, and pay), in part due to the lack of political will 
(eg dismissal, redundancy unless motivated by discriminatory reasons (eg sex, race etc)). In these 
areas where there is no EU legislation the national rules remain the point of reference. 
One explanation for this pot-pourri of EU legislation is that there is no clear justification for the EU to 
act in the field of social policy. Various rationales have been offered for EU legislation over the years: 
(1) The creation of a level playing field on which companies across the EU can compete equally. 
This justification was also the original rationale for including the provisions on equal pay in 
the Treaty of Rome; 
(2) The need to ensure that those workers exercising their free movement rights enjoyed a core 
of protection in whichever country they work. A more modern version of this justification 
might be that all workers are EU citizens and workers’ rights form the core of EU social 
citizenship; 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
90 OJ 2005 L195/15. 
91 OJ 2010 L134/66. 
92 This eventually led to a challenge to the Parental Leave Directive 96/34 in Case T-135/96 UEAPME v Council 
EU:T:1998:128. 
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(3) The need to give the EU a human face: without social measures, citizens would see the EU 
merely as an economic enterprise in which they had no stake. Ultimately this would lead to 
an undermining of popular support for the EU. This was part of the rationale behind the 
1974 and 1989 Social Action programmes. 
The use of various legal bases for EU social policy measures over the years underlines the contested 
rationale for adopting social policy measures at EU level. So, for example, the real justification for 
the adoption of the Working Time Directive, despite the rhetoric of health and safety, might have 
had more to do with rationale (3), with a spoonful of rationale (1). The Posted Workers Directive 
96/71, by contrast, with its legal basis in the services provisions of the Treaty, 93 had more to do with 
rationale (1), with rationale (2) as a subsidiary objective. This is confirmed in the Preamble to the 
Directive, which makes clear that the Directive is intended to promote the transnational provision of 
services in a ‘climate of fair competition’ while ‘guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers’.  
While it is easy to fill the Preamble of a proposed Directive with references that support the 
Commission’s choice of legal basis, 94 the real justifications for the adoption of a measure have 
depended much on the economic climate. When times are good, states are less hawkish about the 
justification for a measure and recognise the value of rationale (3) (human face). This may explain 
the states’ willingness to accept the raft of EU legislation in the 1970s and 80s. However, when times 
are hard, states require more convincing about the need for, and value of, any legislation, let alone 
EU legislation.  
 THE CJEU AND EU SOCIAL POLICY 5.
The role of the CJEU in the evolution of social policy at EU level should not be underestimated. For a 
long time the Court was perceived as a champion and defender of EU social rights. And there are a 
number of leading cases where it is widely accepted that the Court has not only broadened the 
scope of social rights by, for example, improving the position of pregnant workers95 and those who 
care for people with disabilities,96 but it has also ensured that those rights are effective on the 
ground.97  
While the broad reading of the scope of social rights has been welcomed by many employees and 
their representatives, others have argued that the Court’s interpretation has, at times, strayed into 
the realm of rule-making. One example of this was the Court’s willingness to read into the phrase 
‘discrimination on the grounds of sex’, discrimination on the grounds of change of sex, thereby 
extending the protection of the original Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 to transsexuals in the P v 
                                                                
 
93 Arts 53(1) and 62 TFEU. 
94 And thereby to set the CJEU ‘on the right track’ should that choice ever be challenged: De Baere (n 55) 557. 
95 eg Case C-177/88 Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen EU:C:1990:383. 
96 Case C-303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law EU:C:2008:415. 
97 eg Case 152/84 Marshall (No 1) EU:C:1986:84; Case C-188/89 Foster v British Gas EU:C:1990:313; Case C-
271/91 Marshall (No 2) EU:C:1993:335; Joined Cases C-6 and 9/90 Francovich v Italian Republic 
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S case.98 Drawing on the general principle of equality, the Court said that the Equal Treatment 
Directive was ‘simply the expression, in the relevant field, of the principle of equality, which is one of 
the fundamental principles of [Union] law’.99 This enabled the Court to conclude that the scope of 
the Directive could not be confined simply to discrimination based on the fact that a person is of one 
or other sex and so would also apply to discrimination based on gender reassignment.100  
However, in the subsequent case of Grant v South-West Trains101 the Court refused to read the word 
sex to include sexual orientation. Thus, the Court recognised that there were limits to its 
interpretative abilities and that addressing the issue of discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation was a matter for the EU legislature (which quickly acted when it adopted Directive 
2000/78). 
Another area of the Court’s case law that has attracted considerable disapproval of a number of 
Member States concerns the Working Time Directive 2003/88. Two particular issues have proved 
difficult: 
• the question of what constitutes working time for the purposes of determining what time 
counts towards the 48-hour working week, and  
• whether, in the case of casual workers, holiday pay can be rolled up as part of the payment 
when working.102  
By contrast, as we have seen, the Court’s decisions in the seminal cases of Viking and Laval attracted 
equal opprobrium from the trade union movement.  
 EU SOCIAL POLICY AND THE CRISIS 6.
The EU’s response to the financial and economic crisis is destined to have a profound effect on the 
future shape of EU social policy. The picture of an EU acquiring ever greater competences in the field 
of EU social policy has frozen. The EU, once seen as a saviour of social policy, is now viewed in some 
states as a threat to the very existence of social policy, both at EU level (there are few legislative 
proposals on the table) – and, more importantly, at national level. Deregulation of national labour 
standards – in those key areas where there is no EU legislation – has been seen as an essential pre-
requisite to making the EU’s labour market more flexible.  
This push towards deregulation can be seen most clearly in the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) 
with those states in receipt of a ‘bailout’ (formally the financial assistance programmes). This makes 
                                                                
 
98 Case C-13/94 P v S and Cornwall County Council EU:C:1996:170. 
99 para 17. 
100 para 20. Cf the Opinion of Tesauro AG in P v S and Cornwall County Council EU:C:1995:444, point 24. 
101 Case C-249/96 Grant v South West Trains EU:C:1998:63. 
102 The Court has now decided that this is not possible: Joined Cases C-131/04 and C-257/04 Robinson-Steele 
EU:C:2006:177, para 50. A further issue has also arisen as to whether those on long-term sick leave were 
entitled to take annual leave. The CJEU answered affirmatively: Joined Cases C-350/06 and C-520/06 Schultz-
Hoff and Stringer EU:C:2009:18. 
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it clear that key reforms of labour law are necessary as a condition for receiving financial assistance 
from the EU/IMF. Space precludes a detailed analysis of these lengthy documents but the example 
of Portugal103 will suffice to make the point. In the MoU, Portugal committed itself to a range of cuts 
in the employment field including a temporary suspension of thirteenth and fourteenth-month 
bonus salary payments for civil servants and pensioners who earned more than €1,000 a month. It 
also agreed to implement a reform in the severance payments for new hires in line with a tripartite 
agreement of March 2011. This included reforming the law on individual dismissal as well as aligning 
the severance payments of open-ended contracts with those of fixed-term contracts and reducing 
total severance payments for new open-ended contracts from 30 to 10 days per year of tenure (with 
10 additional days to be paid by an employers’ financed fund), with a cap of 12 months and 
elimination of the 3 months of pay irrespective of tenure, and reducing total severance payments for 
fixed-term contracts from 36 to 10 days per year of tenure for contracts shorter than 6 months and 
from 24 to 10 days for longer contracts (with 10 additional days to be paid by an employers’ 
financed fund). Such reforms go straight to the heart of the national labour law systems, which in 
turn go to the core of national sovereignty. To date the Court has refused to hear any challenges to 
the compatibility of the reforms with the Charter of Fundamental Rights.104 
The EU’s governance reforms, including the Euro Plus Pact (EPP) 105 and the ‘six pack’ adopted in the 
Autumn of 2011, 106 also reveal something of the EU’s attitude to labour market regulation. While 
these measures focus mainly on the need for greater surveillance of the Member States’ economic 
policies to prevent states from running up such large debts as well as reducing those debts already 
incurred, they also have a direct and an indirect impact on labour law and social policy. The Pact is 
upfront: it focuses ‘primarily on areas that fall under national competence’. In the absence of EU 
                                                                
 
103 On 17 May 2011, the Council adopted Implementing Decision 2011/344/EU (OJ 2011 L159/88) to make 
available to Portugal medium-term financial assistance for a period of three years 2011-2014 in accordance 
with Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation 
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106 Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the 
effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area (OJ 2011 L306/1); Regulation (EU) No 
1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures 
to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area (OJ 2011 L306/8); Regulation (EU) No 
1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ 2011 L306/12); Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances (OJ 2011 L306/25); Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deficit procedure (OJ 2011 L306/33); Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for 
budgetary frameworks of the Member States (OJ 2011 L306/41). 
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competence, the EU can encourage and exhort but cannot actually put mechanisms in place to order 
change. Rather it can facilitate change through peer pressure, targets and guidelines. This can be 
seen in the provisions under the heading ‘Fostering competitiveness’. It provides that ‘[e]ach country 
will be responsible for the specific policy actions it chooses to foster competitiveness, but the 
following reforms will be given particular attention: 
• respecting national traditions of social dialogue and industrial relations, measures to ensure 
costs developments in line with productivity, such as: 
o review the wage setting arrangements, and, where necessary, the degree of 
centralisation in the bargaining process, and the indexation mechanisms, while 
maintaining the autonomy of the social partners in the collective bargaining process; 
o ensure that wages settlements in the public sector support the competitiveness 
efforts in the private sector (bearing in mind the important signalling effect of public 
sector wages)’. 
However, the EPP is not purely deregulatory. As a product of many hands, it sought both to assuage 
the concerns of the Germans who want more control over national expenditure while at the same 
time supporting other states, such as Spain and Belgium, which are wedded to the maintenance of 
their national social systems. Hence the final Pact does create the space to recognise the diversity of 
the national systems.  
 CONCLUSIONS 7.
The fate of EU social law illustrates how the project of European integration by way of market 
integration and free trade carries within it the seeds both of its undeniable success in fulfilling its 
purpose, that is, bringing peace in Europe,107 and of some of the problematic aspects of European 
integration. The ‘technocratic’ approach that seems to work so well in the ‘technical’ core business 
does not work nearly as well outside that core, and prompts questions with regard to transparency 
and democratic accountability. 108 In particular, the way in which the Union and its Member States 
have handled the euro area crisis shows the limits of what can be achieved through ‘technical’ 
means. 109  
On the other hand, what has been achieved in the EU over the last forty years in the field of social 
policy has been remarkable. Even faced with the crisis, the current social acquis is resilient and has 
the capacity to develop. We are not advocating progress towards a deep and comprehensive social 
integration requiring significant redistribution: 110 the current Treaty framework does not permit 
                                                                
 
107 See art 3(1) EU: ‘The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’. 
108 G De Baere, ‘European Integration and the Rule of Law in Foreign Policy’ in J Dickson and P Eleftheriadis 
(eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012) 365-366, focusing on 
problematic aspects of EU external action in general and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in 
particular. 
109 See J Habermas, Democracy, Solidarity, and the European Crisis (Leuven: KU Leuven Euroforum, 26 April 
2013). 
110 See in that sense as regards EU action to address the sovereign debt crisis: K Lenaerts, Economic 
Integration, Solidarity and Legitimacy. The EU in a Time of Crisis (Leuven: KU Leuven Euroforum, 2013) 3. 
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this. As the Commission put it in its communication on strengthening the EMU, it must be borne in 
mind 
 that the general social agenda is a matter for the 28 Member States. It should also be noted 
that employment and social policies fall very largely under the national competence of the 
Member States. 111 
The following section explores the possibilities for further steps towards an ESU in the current 
Treaties, without looking in detail at what amendments to the Treaties could achieve or whether 
there is any possibility for attaining an ESU through a new international agreement between the 
Member States or some of the Member States. 112 Inevitably, a number of matters that are 
important for progress towards an ESU, but are not part of the social acquis as such are not 
discussed in detail. That is notably the case for education, which is intimately linked to 
employment. 113 
C. UNFULFILLED POTENTIAL? SOME IDEAS GOING FORWARD 
 A POSSIBLE AGENDA  1.
Three areas that could be singled out as needing the EU’s attention, where EU level activity might be 
justified given the transnational dimension, and where action has direct connection with the 
European Semester, the cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination within the EU. 114 These 
areas are (1) employment, pensions and social exclusion; (2) protection of migrant workers; (3) 
privatisation of public services. We shall consider these in turn. We shall then consider how market 
mechanisms can be used to deliver social benefits. 
1.1 EMPLOYMENT, PENSIONS AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION 
EMPLOYMENT AND PENSIONS 
The first area which might benefit from EU action is the employment and pensions implications of an 
ageing population. This is already flagged up in the EPP: 
                                                                
 
111 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
Strengthening the Social Dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union (COM(2013) 690 final) 1. 
112 On which see eg S Van Hecke, J Lievens, S Sottiaux, and W Wolfs, A Social Compact for a Social Union? 
(Leuven: KU Leuven Euroforum, 2014). 
113 Thillaye, Kouba, Sachs (n 41) 40-44. 
114 See Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ 2011 L306/12). Further information 
can be found at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/special-reports/european-semester?lang=en and 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/the_european_semester/index_en.htm.  
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Reforms necessary to ensure the sustainability and adequacy of pensions and social benefits 
could include: 
- aligning the pension system to the national demographic situation, for example by aligning 
the effective retirement age with life expectancy or by increasing participation rates; 
- limiting early retirement schemes and using targeted incentives to employ older workers 
(notably in the age tranche above 55). 
The justification for EU involvement here relates to the key issue of sustainability of public finances 
which, as the Eurozone crisis has shown, is a matter of common interest. The EU has long had 
expertise in the discrimination area, starting with sex and then in respect of other grounds. 
Addressing age discrimination fits in with this 115 and also dovetails with the EU’s social cohesion 
agenda. On a related issue, family friendly policies - which would include elder care as well as child 
care – would fit within this remit. The reform of the Parental Leave Directive serves only to highlight 
other lacuna in EU provision such as the absence of provisions on the right to request reduced hours 
working. 
MINIMUM PAY 
A European Anti-Poverty Network study has suggested that a directive containing minimum 
standards on a minimum income could be adopted on the basis of Article 153(1)(h) TFEU, which 
provides for the Union to support and complement the activities of the Member States in the 
integration of persons excluded from the labour market. The TFEU does not exclude the adoption of 
measures providing for financial support for the integration of people excluded from the labour 
market, but as the study recognizes, such a directive could not touch upon minimum wages, 
because, as we have seen, Article 153(5) TFEU excludes the application of the provisions of that 
Article to pay. 116 A directive containing minimum standards for any type of income support for 
people excluded from the labour market would therefore have to be phrased very carefully indeed 
so as not to contain pay in any shape or form. That would of necessity substantively limit the scope 
of such a measure.  
At any rate, the European Parliament in its report on a genuine EMU has listed Article 153(1) TFEU in 
general and point (h) in particular, next to Article 151 TFEU and Article 9 TFEU (considered below), 
among the provisions of the current Treaties regarding employment and social policies the full 
potential of which has up to now been untapped, 117 and Commission President designate Jean-
                                                                
 
115 On how age discrimination fits within the history and structure of the principle of equality and the 
prohibition of discrimination in EU law, see the Opinion of Sharpston AG in Case C-427/06 Bartsch 
EU:C:2008:297, points 28-65. 
116 A Van Lancker, Working document on a Framework Directive on Minimum Income (Brussels: European Anti-
Poverty Network, 2010) 7-8. 
117 European Parliament, Report with recommendations to the Commission on the report of the Presidents of 
the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup: "Towards a 
genuine Economic and Monetary Union" (2012/2151(INI)) (A7-0339/2012) 8, recital AP. 
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Claude Juncker has wasted no time in coming out in favour of a minimum wage in all EU Member 
States. 118 Nevertheless, as a recent Eurofound study noted, ‘any form of coordination of minimum 
wage policies would either require significant changes in the treaties or some form of voluntary soft 
coordination at the level of governments or social partners’. 119 
That said, as already noted by the European Convention Working Group on Social Europe, 120 
although what is now Article 153(5) TFEU rules out the adoption of uniform minimum requirements 
on pay, it does not rule out the possibility of adopting measures under other provisions of the 
Treaties, even if these measures have an impact on pay, and, as we have seen, a number of Union 
instruments in fact contain provisions on pay. 121 Furthermore, Article 153(4), second dash, TFEU 
provides that the social policy measures adopted on the basis of Article 153 TFEU do not prevent any 
Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures compatible with 
the Treaties.  
In combination with the exclusion of Union competence to harmonize minimum pay, this would 
arguably allow Member States to establish a common minimum wage or to harmonize the age and 
conditions of retirement 122 on the basis of their own competences, which they have retained in 
accordance with Articles 4(1) and 5(2) TEU. 123 The Member States could do so jointly through an 
international agreement. However, they would do well to frame the higher common standard as 
being in turn a minimum standard, 124 in order to avoid a potential infringement of exclusive external 
Union competence on the basis of Article 3(2) TFEU, which grants the Union exclusive competence 
‘for the conclusion of an international agreement … in so far as its conclusion may affect common 
rules or alter their scope’. 125 That said, given that the Union lacks the competence directly to 
legislate on pay, the risk of existing Union rules being affected by an agreement between the 
Member States on minimum pay is less marked than it would be if the Union did have legislative 
competence in that area. 
 
                                                                
 
118 ‘EU’s Juncker urges minimum wage in all EU countries’, Reuters 15 July 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/15/eu-commission-juncker-wage-idUSB5N0OK00120140715.  
119 Eurofound, Pay in Europe in the 21st century (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 
2014) 3. 
120 European Convention, Final report of Working Group XI on Social Europe (CONV 516/1/03) 14, para 28. 
121 See section B.2.1 above. 
122 cf in that sense J-C Piris, The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU? (Cambridge: CUP, 2012) 112. 
123 On competence, see section B.1 above. 
124 See Opinion 2/91 ILO Convention No 170 EU:C:1993:106, para 18; Opinion 1/03 Competence of the 
Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters EU:C:2006:81, paras 123 and 127; and (a contrario) Case C-114/12 
Commission v Council EU:C:2014:2151, para 91. See further G De Baere, ‘EU External Action’ in C Barnard 
and S Peers (eds), European Union Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 721-722. 
125 The CJEU has interpreted that phrase (which originates from ERTA (n 47), para 22) in Case C-114/12 
Commission v Council EU:C:2014:2151, paras 64-75. The Court has also confirmed that art 3(2) TFEU applies 
to agreements between Member States in Case C-370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:756, paras 100-101. Contra: 
View of Kokott AG in Case C-370/12 Pringle EU:C:2012:675, point 98. 
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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
In his December 2012 Report, Herman Van Rompuy suggested the establishment of an 
unemployment insurance as a microeconomic approach towards the shock absorption function of a 
euro area fiscal capacity. In such a scenario, it was envisaged that the fiscal capacity would work as a 
complement or partial substitute to national unemployment insurance systems. 126 However, in the 
light of the limited scope of the relevant Union competence, it appears highly doubtful that a fully 
developed unemployment insurance, especially one intended as a substitute to existing national 
systems, could be adopted on the basis of Article 153(1)(c) TFEU. 127 The establishment of such 
unemployment insurance by the EU would therefore in all likelihood require the amendment of the 
Treaties.  
That said, the adoption of minimum requirements for unemployment insurances for gradual 
implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of the 
Member States and avoiding imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which 
would hold back the creation and development of small and medium-sized undertakings in the 
Member States as per Article 153(2), first subpara, (b) TFEU could possibly be envisaged on the basis 
of Article 153(1)(c) TFEU. 
CONCLUSION 
While the room for EU action in the field of employment, pensions, and social exclusion is inherently 
restricted by the limited competences attributed to the Union in that regard, this must not prevent 
the Union and its Member States from examining creative solutions, and possibly combining 
minimum standards at EU level with a deeper form of coordination between the Member States 
outside but complementary to the strict Union framework.  
1.2 PROTECTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS 
The second area where EU action might be possible concerns migrant workers. There is a growing 
body of evidence that migrant workers are being mistreated by some employers in certain sectors. 
For example, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation conducted research into forced labour by migrants in 
the food industry. 128 It found that migrants often felt bullied and ‘treated like livestock’; there were 
often attempts to avoid paying the workers or underpaying them. They also threatened employees 
with dismissal if they refused overtime or became ill or pregnant.  
                                                                
 
126 H Van Rompuy, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union (Brussels, 5 December 2012) 11. 
127 R Repasi, Legal options for an additional EMU fiscal capacity (European Parliament, Directorate General for 
Internal Policies Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Affairs, 
2013) 26. 
128 S Scott, G Craig, A Geddes, Experiences of Forced Labour in the UK Food Industry (York: Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, 2012), available at http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/forced-labour-uk-food-industry.  
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If these workers cannot, for practical reasons, enforce their rights, there is a role for the EU to 
consider intervening to requiring effective remedies. The new Directive on free movement of 
workers, based on Article 46 TFEU, is a step in the right direction. 129 But there is evidence that many 
migrant workers do not enforce their rights. This requires more pro-active enforcement. There may 
well be a role for greater coordination at EU level of, for example, labour inspectors. 130 
If the EU was to devote its attention to the position of vulnerable migrant workers, other issues also 
arise. In particular, the question of whether they are ‘workers’ at all or are they classified as self- 
employed and thus denied employment rights? What sort of contracts are they on? Should a new 
type of contract be envisaged which abandons the well known distinctions of employee/worker/self-
employed and looks instead at the heart of the issue, namely the question whether the individual is 
providing personal service?131 Of course these are highly sensitive issues that do not attract much 
consensus in the Member States. And what about rights for those individuals who do not fall into the 
narrowly protected class of employees: the self-employed, those on zero hours contracts and the 
like? The EU has already been involved in discussions concerning the single open-ended contract 
(SOEC).  
The EU could consider a broad framework directive covering all employment rights to overcome the 
fact that measures such as, for example, the Transfer of Undertakings Directive 2001/23 (based on 
Article 94 EC, now Article 115 TFEU) applies to ‘employees’, 132 while the Working Time Directive 
2003/88 (based on Article 137(2) EC, now Article 153(2) TFEU) applies to the broader group of 
‘workers’. 133 In order to extend the personal scope of EU employment rights to the broadest group 
of individuals, any such directive would pursue objectives and contain components of both internal 
market (such as regarding the transfer of undertakings) and social policy (such as working time). 
According to settled CJEU case law, if a measure pursues a twofold purpose or has a twofold 
component and if one of those is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, 
the measure must be founded on the single legal basis required by the main or predominant 
purpose. Exceptionally, if the several objectives are inseparably linked without one being secondary 
and indirect in relation to the other, the measure must be founded on the various corresponding 
legal bases. 134 However, in accordance with the Titanium Dioxide line of case law, no dual legal basis 
is possible where the procedures required by each legal basis are incompatible. 135 Applied to the 
measure contemplated here, if neither the internal market nor the social policy components can be 
                                                                
 
129 Directive 2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on measures 
facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers 
(OJ 2014 L128/8). 
130 As contemplated in recital 20 in the preamble to Directive 2014/54/EU. 
131 M Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford: OUP, 2003). 
132 cf its title: Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses 
or parts of undertakings or businesses. See also art 2(1)(d). 
133 cf eg the definition of ‘working time’ in art 2(1). 
134 Case C-377/12 Commission v Council EU:C:2014:1903, para 34 and the case-law cited there. 
135 See n 55 above. 
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identified as the predominant one, the measure would have to be based on a combined legal basis 
of Articles 115 and 153(1)(b) TFEU. Yet that double legal basis could fall foul of the Titanium Dioxide 
case-law just mentioned, which proscribes the combination of incompatible legal bases, here the 
Council acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting 
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee (Article 115 TFEU) and the 
European Parliament and the Council acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure 
after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (Article 
153(2) TFEU). Nevertheless, if the proposal includes any of the matters listed in Article 153(1)(c), (d), 
(f) and (g) (eg social security, protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated) 
the Council would have to act unanimously, in accordance with a special legislative procedure, after 
consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the 
Regions. 136 Including one or more of those aspects would appear plausible for a comprehensive 
measure, and would have the additional advantage of making the combination of Article 115 and 
153(2) TFEU compatible.  
The EU could also draft such a broad measure by way of a ‘model law’ which states can opt-into if 
they choose. Given the highly sensitive nature of this area of law in many Member States, this 
proposal would operate as a softer form of enhanced cooperation (see below): Member States 
would be under no obligation to sign up to this measure but if they chose to do so, EU rules 
(supremacy, direct effect and the Charter) would apply. The EU could adopt such a model law on the 
same combined legal basis of Articles 115 and 153(2) TFEU, to which arguably Article 352 TFEU 
should be added to the extent that such an instrument constitutes an optional form running 
alongside the national legal orders of the Member States. 137 On the basis of the CJEU’s case-law on 
combining Article 352 TFEU with other legal bases referred to above, the measure in question would 
need to be adopted by a hybrid procedure obtained by combining the procedure of both legal bases. 
Here, that would result in the European Parliament and the Council acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure but with the Council acting unanimously throughout that procedure, 
on a proposal from the Commission after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. Alternatively 
if any of the areas listed in Article 153(1)(c), (d), (f) and (g) TFEU are involved, the Council would have 
to act unanimously, in accordance with a special legislative procedure, after obtaining the consent of 
                                                                
 
136 Art 153(2), third subpara TFEU. Note that art 153(2), fourth subpara TFEU permits the Council by a 
unanimous vote and after consulting the European Parliament to render the ordinary legislative procedure 
applicable to the protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated, representation and 
collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including co-determination, and conditions of 
employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory (art 153(1)(d), (f), and (g) TFEU, 
respectively). 
137 See in that sense Case C-436/03 Parliament v Council EU:C:2006:277. See further K Gutman, The 
Constitutional Foundations of European Contract Law: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford: OUP, 2014 
forthcoming). 
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the European Parliament and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. 138 
Finally, a broad measure covering rights for all categories of workers, including the self-employed 
and those on non-standard types of contracts, could potentially be based on Article 21 TFEU, which 
provides for every citizen of the Union to ‘have the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties 
and by the measures adopted to give them effect’. 139 In order for Article 21 TFEU to be usable as a 
legal basis for social policy measures, it would have to be argued that such measures would actively 
contribute to the freedom of movement rights under EU citizenship, for example by making it less 
cumbersome to travel between Member States. Such an argument could probably be constructed 
with regard to certain social policy measures, though the Member States would probably want to 
tailor such measures so as to encourage the movement of professionally active citizens rather than 
citizens who are likely to have to rely on social security support. 
Another possibility could perhaps be to use Article 25 TFEU, which provides that on the basis of a 
Commission report, and without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties, the Council, acting 
unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of 
the European Parliament, may adopt provisions to strengthen or to add to the rights listed in Article 
20(2), which includes the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States. 140 Provisions adopted on that basis are to enter into force only after their approval by the 
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. In other words, this 
would entail a de facto amendment of the Treaties under a simplified procedure. 
Using EU citizenship as a legal basis for comprehensive social policy measures would enable the 
Union to live up to the oft-repeated phrase in the case-law of the CJEU, according to which  
the status of citizen of the Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States, enabling those among such nationals who find themselves in the same 
situation to receive, as regards the material scope of the FEU Treaty, the same treatment in 
law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for 
in that regard. 141  
Nevertheless, using citizenship as a means to further integration in social matters has a certain 
paradoxical side to it. 142 The use by individuals of their citizenship rights has increasingly important 
financial implications for Member States that have to open their social welfare systems to nationals 
                                                                
 
138 See with respect to potential moral hazard involved in coordinating wages with non-binding instruments: 
Thillaye, Kouba, Sachs (n 41) 18. 
139 Art 21(1) TFEU. See as regards social security: P Schoukens, From Soft Monitoring to Enforceable Action: A 
Quest for New Legal Approaches in the EU Fight Against Social Exclusion (Leuven: KU Leuven Euroforum, 
2013) 35-36. Cf also art 21(3) TFEU with respect to measures concerning social security or social protection. 
140 Art 20(2)(a) TFEU. 
141 See, most recently, Case C-275/12 Elrick EU:C:2013:684, para 19 and the case-law cited therein. 
142 Armstrong (n 59) 238. 
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of other Member States. That dynamic may potentially be as disruptive to social welfare as the 
market freedoms themselves. 143 It is certainly highly politically sensitive. 
1.3 PRIVATISATION OF PUBLICLY OWNED INDUSTRIES AND SERVICES 
Third, privatisation of publicly owned industries and services is clearly an important part of the 
reform agenda for a number of Member States. What are the employment law implications of this? 
Does the Transfer of Undertakings Directive 2001/23 (based on Article 94 EC, now Article 115 TFEU) 
need revision to provide meaningful rights to transferees in the event of the transfer and for a 
significant period thereafter? How does the Directive fit into the public procurement process?144  
Again, there is obvious competence to reform Directive 2001/23 – Article 115 TFEU – the question is 
whether there is sufficient political will to satisfy the unanimous voting requirement. The public 
procurements directives have recently been reformed with an internal market legal basis (Article 
53(1), Article 62 and Article 114).145 Unfortunately, these reformed directives which do contain a 
number of positive developments for social policy, missed the opportunity to address this particular 
problem. 
1.4 MARKET MECHANISMS 
Since market-speak has now taken over so many aspects of life, should labour law think of playing 
the markets at their own game? In other words, should market mechanisms be used to incentivise 
good, socially responsible behaviour? Two examples can be mentioned.  
TRANSPARENCY  
Firms employing more than, say 20 people, would be obliged to publish on their websites certain key 
information such as staff turnover, staff sickness levels. Firms could also be required to state how 
much more, as a factor, is the highest paid worker paid than the lowest worker. Such transparency 
has a cost but modern technology means that such data should be readily available to employers. 
And it would enable putative employees to gain insights into their potential employers that are not 
available in their publicity material. 
There is already some support for this approach, notably in the Corporate Social Responsibility 
proposal, based on Article 50 TFEU on freedom of establishment. 146 The disclosed non-financial 
                                                                
 
143 C Barnard, ‘Social Policy Revisited in the Light of the Constitutional Debate’ in C Barnard (ed), The EU 
Constitutional Debate: the Fundamentals Revisited (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 127-130. See also the Opinion of 
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(2013-2014) 16 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (forthcoming). 
145 See Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
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information will cover at least environmental, social, and employee-related matters, respect for 
human rights, and anti-corruption and bribery matters. It will also require companies to include a 
description of the policies pursued, their outcomes and the risks related to those matters. In 
addition, large, listed companies must provide the information on their policy related to diversity of 
competences and views of the members of administrative, management and supervisory bodies in 
their corporate governance statement.  
INCENTIVISATION  
Can EU law be used to encourage, even require, help for the unemployed? Pursuant to a logic of 
subsidiarity, such action could be taken at the level of the Member States but equally by local actors.  
At the local level, the EU public procurement regime could be used to require local actors to help the 
local unemployed to find work and stay in it for periods of, say 6 months, one year and so forth. This 
presumably could be achieved through national contract law. 
At the level of the Member States, the Country-Specific recommendations (CSRs) issued as part of 
the European semester could be used. Vandenbroucke and Vanhercke suggest in that regard that 
well-conceived contractual arrangements between the EU and the Member States may be a way 
forward if they are based on the genuine reciprocity that is objectively needed in the EU today. 147 
The European Commission has proposed such an arrangement as part of the Convergence and 
Competitiveness Instrument (CCI) a combination of a contractual arrangement with a mechanism for 
financial support to help Member States facing difficulties that may affect the entire Euro area to 
undertake the necessary reforms. 148 Legally, the crucial question is what is understood by 
‘contractual arrangements’. 149 The December 2013 European Council Presidency Conclusions 
stipulate that mutually agreed contractual arrangements ‘will be a “home-grown” commitment 
which constitutes a partnership between the Member States, the Commission and the Council’. The 
economic policy objectives and measures included in the mutually agreed contractual arrangements 
should be designed by the Member States, in accordance with their institutional and constitutional 
arrangements, and should be discussed and mutually agreed with the Commission, before being 
submitted to the Council for approval. The Commission will be responsible for keeping track of the 
agreed implementation of the mutually agreed contractual arrangements on the basis of jointly 
agreed timelines. Any financial support agreement associated with mutually agreed contractual 
arrangements will have a legally binding nature. 150 
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The Commission itself suggested that the instrument could be construed as part and parcel of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) reinforced by contractual arrangements and financial 
support and be based on Article 136 TFEU. 151 Alternatively the Commission envisaged having 
recourse to Article 352 TFEU, if necessary by enhanced cooperation, coupled with a decision 
pursuant to Article 332 TFEU on expenditure being included in the EU budget. 152  
Could such contractual arrangements take the form of international agreements? The Union itself 
has legal personality 153 and in each of the Member States, it is to enjoy the most extensive legal 
capacity accorded to legal persons under their respective laws. 154 However, of the institutions listed 
in Article 13(1) TEU, only the ECB has legal personality. 155 The European Investment Bank (EIB), 
though not an institution within the meaning of Article 13(1) TEU, also has legal personality. 156 In 
other words, only the ECB and the EIB could conclude binding agreements with other legal persons 
in their own name, while all other institutions listed in Article 13(1) TEU can only enter into 
obligations on behalf of the Union. However, the Union as an international organisation with legal 
personality is still governed by the principle of conferral, pursuant to Article 5(2) TEU, and while it 
indisputably has the competence to conclude agreements with third states and international 
organisations in the circumstances listed in Article 216(1) TFEU, the same does not count for 
international agreements with its own Member States. 157 
The contractual arrangements could perhaps be established through an agreement not with the 
Union or the ECB or EIB, but between the Member States of the Union. As the Court made clear in 
Pringle, such agreements would have to be framed so as not to conflict with Article 3(2) TFEU. 158 
Specifically with respect to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, such arrangements could 
perhaps even be contemplated within the framework of the Benelux, for which Article 350 TFEU 
explicitly makes provision:  
The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the existence or completion of regional 
unions between Belgium and Luxembourg, or between Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, to the extent that the objectives of these regional unions are not attained by 
application of the Treaties.  
Nevertheless, the further consideration of the possibility of achieving further integration towards an 
ESU by way of international agreements between the Member States falls outside the scope of the 
present paper. 159 
                                                                
 
151 cf Piris (n 122) 107, taking the view that the scope of application of Art 136 TFEU is ‘extremely wide’. 
152 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic 
and monetary union. Launching a European Debate (COM(2012) 777 final) 22. 
153 Art 47 TEU. 
154 Art 335 TFEU. 
155 Art 282(3) TFEU. 
156 Art 308 TFEU. 
157 Repasi (n 127) 20.  
158 Pringle (n 125), paras 100-101. 
159 See Van Hecke, Lievens, Sottiaux, Wolfs (n 112). 
Page 36 of 45 
 
 
 ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF DELIVERING PROGRESS? MAINSTREAMING AND 2.
ENHANCED COOPERATION 
If the proposals outlined in the previous section are too radical for all Member States, are there 
alternative ways of delivering progress? We consider two possibilities: the horizontal clause in 
Article 9 TFEU and the role for enhanced cooperation  
2.1 THE HORIZONTAL SOCIAL CLAUSE: ARTICLE 9 TFEU 
Article 9 TFEU provides that in defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union is to  
 take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the 
guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of 
education, training and protection of human health. 
Opinions differ widely on whether it has made any actual difference in the Union’s policies. Notably, 
the European Parliament in its report on a genuine EMU has mentioned Article 9 TFEU among the 
provisions of the current Treaties regarding employment and social policies the full potential of 
which has up to now been untapped. 160 However, one thing is clear: while Article 9 TFEU obliges the 
Union to take ‘social issues’ into account in all its policies and activities, it does not constitute a new 
conferral of competences and can therefore not be used as a legal basis for developing an ESU, nor 
indeed for any EU act. 161  
What purpose then does Article 9 TFEU serve? The CJEU referred to Article 9 TFEU in Deutsches 
Weintor, holding that:  
 the protection of public health constitutes, as follows also from Article 9 TFEU, an objective 
of general interest justifying, where appropriate, a restriction of a fundamental freedom. 162 
That would appear to imply that not just the protection of human health, but also the other goals in 
Article 9 TFEU, notably the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate 
social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, and training could 
potentially constitute an objective of general interest justifying, where appropriate, a restriction of a 
fundamental freedom. Advocate General Cruz Villalón put it in slightly starker terms in his Opinion in 
dos Santos Palhota: 163 
 To the extent that the new primary law framework provides for a mandatory high level of 
social protection, it authorises the Member States, for the purpose of safeguarding a certain 
level of social protection, to restrict a freedom, and to do so without European Union law’s 
regarding it as something exceptional and, therefore, as warranting a strict interpretation. 
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Article 9 TFEU’s function as a horizontal clause chimes with the calls, notably by Vandenbroucke and 
Vanhecke, not to add a parallel social pillar to the EMU, but to mainstream the social dimension into 
all EMU initiatives. 164 The main relevance of Article 9 TFEU is therefore its potential to require EU 
measures not to affect in a disproportionate manner the social objectives listed in it. 165 A key tool 
for systematically ensuring that the EU's common social objectives are mainstreamed in all relevant 
EU policy areas is the social impact assessment within the Commission’s general Impact Assessment 
System (IAS), 166 and the European Economic and Social Committee has advocated further 
strengthening of it. 167  
The CJEU could in turn play its role by scrutinizing the arguments on the basis of which the Union 
thought it necessary to introduce certain measures by directly looking at the justification put 
forward in the Impact Assessment. Advocate General Sharpston adopted such an approach in Spain 
v Council with respect to the principle of proportionality, which likewise forms part of Impact 
Assessments, taking the view that the Union legislator had infringed that principle inter alia because 
no Impact Assessment had been carried out. In particular, the Advocate General concluded that in 
the absence of an impact study, it was hard to see how the Council and the Commission could 
conclude that the new system they had introduced constituted the most appropriate measure. 168 
The Court could arguably use Impact Assessment reports in combination with the duty to give 
reasons as laid down in Article 296, second paragraph, TFEU to review the justification of a particular 
proposed measure on the basis of the social objectives listed in Article 9 TFEU. 169 That way, the CJEU 
could at least make sure that the EU legislature had in fact duly considered the social impact of any 
particular measure it wishes to introduce.  
2.2 ENHANCED COOPERATION 
INTRODUCTION 
As Advocate General Bot recalls in his Opinion in the Unitary Patent case, the establishment of an 
enhanced cooperation mechanism was  
inspired by the growing heterogeneity of the Member States and their respective interests 
or specific needs. That mechanism aims to enable and encourage a group of Member States 
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to cooperate inside rather than outside the Union, where it is established that the objectives 
pursued by that cooperation cannot be achieved by the Union as a whole. 170  
Increasing attention is being paid to the merits of enhanced cooperation. For example, Martin 
Sandbu, writing in the Financial Times said: 171  
The European Commission should put behind it the tradition of the ‘Community method’ ... 
It should instead see its job as facilitating coalitions of the willing, and ensuring the closer 
cooperation they develop remain open to late joiners. 
In July 2010, the Council approved for the first time a Commission proposal authorising enhanced 
cooperation with respect to the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, 172 which led to the 
adoption on 20 December 2010 of the Rome III Regulation.173 The second instance followed on 10 
March 2011, when the Council adopted a decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of 
the creation of unitary patent protection,174 which culminated in the adoption of Regulations 
1257/2012 175 and 1260/2012 176 on 17 December 2012. The third and, at the moment, final 
instance, is the Council’s authorisation on 22 January 2013 of enhanced cooperation in the area of 
financial transaction tax. 177 The latter two instances were contested by Italy and Spain, and by the 
UK, respectively, which opposed enhanced cooperation as being potentially dangerous for strategic 
national interests, 178 but the CJEU dismissed both actions. It is perhaps intriguing that while 
enhanced cooperation was possibly intended primarily for ‘social’ matters, such as the Rome III 
Regulation, the last two instances are clearly closely tied up with the functioning of the internal 
market. 179 Nevertheless, in its judgments in the Unitary Patent 180 and Financial Transactions Tax 181 
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cases, the CJEU provided a number of clarifications on the mechanism of enhanced cooperation that 
may be helpful in assessing its usefulness for further steps towards an ESU.  
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The framework for enhanced cooperation between Member States is enshrined in Title IV of the TEU 
and Title III (Article 20 TEU) of Part Six of the TFEU (Articles 326 to 334 TFEU). Member States that 
wish to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves within the framework of the Union's 
non-exclusive competences may make use of its institutions and exercise those competences by 
applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties. 182  
Enhanced cooperation must be aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union, at protecting its 
interests and at reinforcing its integration process 183 and must comply with the Treaties and Union 
law. 184 Those conditions help prevent enhanced cooperation being used to turn back the integration 
process. 185 In addition, it must not undermine the internal market or economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, must not constitute a barrier to, or discrimination in, trade between Member States, and 
must not distort competition between them. 186  
Acts adopted in the framework of enhanced cooperation are binding only on those Member States 
that participate in such cooperation. They do not form part of the acquis that has to be accepted by 
candidate States for accession to the Union. 187 At the same time, enhanced cooperation must 
respect the competences, rights and obligations of those Member States that do not participate in it. 
Those Member States, in turn, must not impede its implementation by the participating Member 
States. 188 In the Unitary Patent judgment, the CJEU clarified that while it is  
 essential for enhanced cooperation not to lead to the adoption of measures that might 
prevent the non-participating Member States from exercising their competences and rights 
or shouldering their obligations, it is, in contrast, permissible for those taking part in this 
cooperation to prescribe rules with which those non-participating States would not agree if 
they did take part in it. 189 
That also implies that the fact that some Member States are ‘excluded’ from a certain measure 
following their decision not to take part in the relevant enhanced cooperation is not proof of the 
Council having misused its powers by authorising the enhanced cooperation. 190 If, for example, an 
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agreement could be reached between the required number of Member States to establish closed 
cooperation for a measure based on Article 153(1)(h) TFEU on minimum standards for any type of 
income support for people excluded from the labour market, 191 the fact that the some non-
participating Member States would dislike the resulting measures would be no obstacle to their 
adoption.  
Enhanced cooperation must involve at least nine Member States and must be authorised by the 
Council. The Council is to give its authorisation as a last resort only, when it has established that the 
objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a 
whole. 192 The CJEU held in the Unitary Patent judgment that Article 20 TEU and Articles 326 TFEU to 
334 TFEU do not circumscribe the right to resort to enhanced cooperation solely to the case in which 
at least one Member State declares that it is not yet ready to take part in a legislative action of the 
Union in its entirety. The impossibility referred to in Article 20(2) TEU  
 may be due to various causes, for example, lack of interest on the part of one or more 
Member States or the inability of the Member States, who have all shown themselves 
interested in the adoption of an arrangement at Union level, to reach agreement on the 
content of that arrangement. 193 
Nevertheless, the CJEU held the ‘last resort’ condition to be particularly important, concluding that 
the expression ‘as a last resort’ highlights ‘the fact that only those situations in which it is impossible 
to adopt such legislation in the foreseeable future may give rise to the adoption of a decision 
authorising enhanced cooperation’. 194 Advocate General Bot noted that for this condition to be 
fulfilled, it is not necessary for a legislative proposal to have been rejected by a vote, but rather the 
presence of a genuine deadlock at some stage of the legislative process, which demonstrates that 
reaching a compromise is impossible, 195 and the Court agreed. 196 
Crucially, when enhanced cooperation is being established, it is to be open to all Member States, 
subject to compliance with any conditions of participation laid down by the authorising decision and, 
where applicable, with the acts already adopted within that framework. 197 The Commission and the 
Member States participating in enhanced cooperation are to ensure that they promote participation 
by as many Member States as possible. 198 
Member States intending to establish enhanced cooperation in fields relevant for an ESU are to 
address a request to the Commission, specifying the scope and objectives of the enhanced 
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cooperation proposed. The Commission may then submit a proposal to the Council, 199 which takes 
its decision by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 200  
The provisions on enhanced cooperation allow Member States to make use of the Union’s 
institutions and exercise its competences by applying the relevant provisions of the Treaties. 201 This 
means that the procedure to be followed is that prescribed in the Treaty provision constituting the 
substantive legal basis. While all members of the Council may take part in the relevant deliberations, 
only those representing participating Member States are to take part in the vote. 202  
Of importance if enhanced cooperation were to be contemplated with respect to proposals based 
on for example Article 352 TFEU, is that the CJEU clarified in the Unitary Patent judgment that 
nothing in Article 20 TEU or in Articles 326 TFEU to 334 TFEU forbids the Member States to establish 
enhanced cooperation within the ambit of those competences for which the Council must decide 
unanimously. On the contrary, it follows from Article 333(1) TFEU that, when the conditions laid 
down in Article 20 TEU and in Articles 326 TFEU to 334 TFEU have been satisfied, those powers may 
be used in enhanced cooperation and that, in that case, provided that the Council has not decided to 
act by qualified majority, it is the votes of only those Member States taking part that constitute 
unanimity. 203 Indeed, not being able to resort to enhanced cooperation in areas in which unanimity 
applies would defeat the purpose of the mechanism to a significant extent, as the type of deadlock 
enhanced cooperation is intended to overcome is particularly likely in matters that require 
unanimity in the Council. 204 That welcome clarification opens up the possibility of using enhanced 
cooperation to adopt a number of measures for which the Council needs to act unanimously. Four 
examples illustrate that point:  
(i) the adoption on the basis of Article 153(1)(c) TFEU of minimum requirements for 
unemployment insurances for gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions 
and technical rules obtaining in each of the Member States and avoiding imposing 
administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which would hold back the 
creation and development of small and medium-sized undertakings in the Member 
States as per Article 152(2), first subpara, (b) TFEU. 205 
(ii) a draft model-law which the Member States can opt-into on the combined legal basis of 
Articles 115, 153(2), and 352 TFEU; 206 
(iii) a new measure based on Article 115 TFEU to replace the Transfer of Undertakings 
Directive with a new measure granting a broad spectrum of rights to transferees; 207 
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(iv) the establishment of a financial instrument combined with so-called contractual 
arrangements related to employment-related obligations for Member States receiving 
financial support on the basis of Article 352 TFEU by enhanced cooperation, coupled 
with a decision pursuant to Article 332 TFEU on expenditure being included in the EU 
budget; 208 
Any Member State wishing to become a party to an existing form of enhanced cooperation in areas 
relevant for an ESU is to notify its intention to the Council and the Commission. 209 The Commission 
then decides, within four months of the date of notification, on the participation of the Member 
State concerned. 210  
Enhanced cooperation was not directly used to combat the euro area crisis, but is explicitly 
contemplated in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union (TSCG), Article 10 of which provides: 211 
 In accordance with the requirements of the Treaties on which the European Union is 
founded, the Contracting Parties stand ready to make active use, whenever appropriate and 
necessary, of measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro, as 
provided for in Article 136 [TFEU], and of enhanced cooperation … on matters that are 
essential for the proper functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal 
market. 
The Member States of course did not need the TSCG to tell them they could make use of the 
enhanced cooperation mechanism. 212 At any rate, such enhanced cooperation is only possible with 
respect to competences that have actually been conferred on the Union. As the CJEU held in Pringle, 
it is clear from Article 20(1) TEU that ‘enhanced cooperation may be established only where the 
Union itself is competent to act in the area concerned by that cooperation’. 213 In other words, 
enhanced cooperation is not intended as a means to circumvent the principle of conferral, but the 
lack of political will of some of the Member States to exercise specific EU competences. 214 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether what the CJEU said in Pringle a contrario means that 
where the Union does have the relevant competences, the Member States ought to have recourse 
to enhanced cooperation rather than mechanisms set-up outside the EU legal order, such as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
207 See section C.1.3 above.  
208 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic 
and monetary union. Launching a European Debate (COM(2012) 777 final) 22. See section C.1.4 above.  
209 Art 331(1), first subpara, TFEU. 
210 Art 331(1), second subpara, TFEU. 
211 Note that art 16 TSCG provides for the integration of that agreement in the EU legal order. 
212 Hinarejos (n 44) 256. They probably did not need the TSCG at all, as most of what it did could have been 
done under existing EU competences: P Craig, ‘The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: principle, 
politics and pragmatism’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 233; A Dashwood, ‘The United Kingdom in a re-
formed European Union’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 743. 
213 Pringle (n 125), para 167. 
214 Hinarejos (n 44) 260. 
Page 43 of 45 
 
 
   
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 215 It could be argued on the basis of the principle of sincere 
cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU that the Member States in such circumstances must at least make an 
honest attempt to take the enhanced cooperation route before heading off on their own extra-
Union affair. 216 
CONCLUSION 
A significant advantage of relying on enhanced cooperation to work towards an ESU as compared 
with ESM-like constructions is that it takes place entirely within the EU legal order and the EU 
institutional and constitutional framework, including its guarantees on democratic representation 
through the European Parliament and judicial protection through the CJEU. The Court exercises 
judicial review as regards the Council authorisation to engage in enhanced cooperation, decisions to 
allow a Member State to participate in enhanced cooperation after it has been established, and the 
implementation of enhanced cooperation. 217 Furthermore and crucially, regardless of whether the 
Charter applies to action by the EU institutions or the Member States within the ESM or like 
structures, setting such mechanisms up through enhanced cooperation would make the applicability 
of the Charter unassailable. 218 Enhanced cooperation also provides those Member States unwilling 
to participate the guarantee that their interests will be protected through the specific guarantees in 
the Treaties referred to above and the participation of the EU institutions within the EU legal order.  
Various institutional questions nevertheless remain open. While Member States not taking part in 
the enhanced cooperation can take part in the debates in the Council without a right to vote, that is 
not the case for their MEPs, who take part in all relevant decision-making despite their Member 
State not taking part in the enhanced cooperation. 219 Also unclear is whether the lack of applicable 
exception to the subsidiarity mechanism in the Treaties and the relevant Protocol implies that 
national parliaments of non-participating Member States can issue yellow and orange cards with 
respect to measures adopted within the framework of an enhanced cooperation in which they play 
no part. 220 
D. CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate that the current acquis presents a solid if still narrow base 
on which to build an ESU, and that the current Treaties provide a number of possibilities for taking 
important, if incremental, steps towards such an ESU. As the European Parliament noted in its report 
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on a genuine EMU: ‘future Treaty changes should not be an obstacle to the swift implementation of 
what can already be achieved under the existing Treaties’. 221 The Union should make full use of that 
potential while actively considering the long-term options. The distinction between short-term and 
long-term options is to a significant extent based on the presence or absence of Union competence.  
If the Union has the relevant competence, existing Treaty provisions should be actively used as sole 
or combined legal bases. As will be clear from the above, the issue is quite often not that the Union 
lacks competence, but that the Member States are unwilling to use it or unable to reach a 
compromise. This paper argues that enhanced cooperation appears to be an avenue worth 
considering in such situations, especially but not restricted to all the possibilities suggested above for 
which the Union has the requisite competences, but progress has been underwhelming. It also 
chimes well with the idea of an ESU as ‘far removed from a top-down, “one size fits all” approach to 
social policy-making in the Member States’, and enables a combination of both ‘greater room for 
manoeuvre and tangible support for Member States that opt for a social investment strategy’ and 
‘genuine scope for exploration and mutual learning on the ways and means to achieve those 
outcomes’. 222 
If the Union lacks the relevant competence, this inevitably means that the corresponding 
competences have remained with the Member States. 223 A distinction should then be drawn 
between three types of issues that fall outside Union competence. First, there are issues outside 
Union competence but which the Member States could arguably regulate acting independently or 
collectively through an international agreement of limited scope. Such Member State action would 
be outside the strict confines of EU competence, but complementary to it, and would not require 
amendment to the Treaties nor should it affect existing EU law. This paper cited the possibility for 
the Member States to establish a common minimum guaranteed wage or to harmonize the age and 
conditions of retirement by way of such an agreement as examples. Second, there are more 
systemic issues involving greater steps towards an ESU, most often with institutional implications. 
Such issues would require the conclusion of an agreement between Member States of a much 
broader scope and not restricted to an issue such as minimum pay. The possibility for such 
agreements is the subject of another KU Leuven Euroforum paper and was not considered further 
here. 224 Third, some issues require amendment of the Treaties. That would clearly be the case for 
profound systemic changes to the institutional or constitutional set-up of the Union. It appears fairly 
clear that expedients outside the EU legal order such as the TSCG could not be used to effect the 
institutional changes that a ‘genuine EMU’ would entail. 225 Treaty amendment would also be 
necessary if the Union should legislate or otherwise take action in areas from which it is now 
excluded. For example, if Union action on minimum pay is preferred to Member State individual or 
collective action outside the Union, the Treaties should be amended accordingly.  
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Nevertheless, in contemplating the conferral of additional competences on the Union, heed should 
be taken of a paradox: the more competences the EU has been given, including using the ordinary 
legislative procedure, the harder it has been to adopt EU legislation. The reasons for this are well-
known: an expanded and increasingly heterogeneous EU means that it is ever more difficult to 
regulate on any topic. This problem is aggravated by the subject area: social policy is seen as so 
sensitive in so many national systems and, as we saw above, going to the core of national 
sovereignty. It is no coincidence that the national parliaments chose to use the yellow card 
procedure for the first time in respect of the Monti II proposal. 226  
Whatever the merits of amending the Treaties or moving towards greater integration on the basis of 
agreements between the Member States – and as Thomas Franck put it, there is ‘no contest in 
absolute merit between imagining the ideal and getting that little incremental thing done’ 227 – using 
the full potential of the current Treaties should be the logical first port of call.  
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